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Abstract: The search for water sustainability requires not only a combination of technical 
and managerial responses, but also firm action against socioeconomic injustices and 
political inequalities. The recognition of the politicised nature of water problems deserves 
particular attention in areas marred by long-term trends of environmental degradation and 
social exclusion. A case study of the Baixada Fluminense, an urbanised wetland in the 
Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro, illustrates the challenge to reverse unsustainable 
practices in situations where water problems have been politically and electorally exploited. 
The research made use of an interdisciplinary approach to assess past and present initiatives 
that have attempted, but systematically failed, to restore river ecology and improve water 
services. The empirical results have important implications for water policy making and 
urban planning.  
Keywords: Water sustainability; water policy; water conflicts; river restoration; 
environmental justice; integrated water management; Baixada Fluminense; Rio de Janeiro. 
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1. Introduction: Water Sustainability 
 
The meaning of sustainable water management has evolved and expanded since the early years of 
the debate in the mid-1980s. There is now a stronger emphasis on the dynamic interaction between 
nature conservation and the demands of different social groups, as well as recognition of the 
conflicting perceptions of environmental problems and the limits of science in dealing with risk and 
uncertainty. Policy-making moved away from merely meeting quantitative water demands and 
restoring ecological features into broader concerns about the integration of spatial and temporal scales 
of multidimensional management issues. Water sustainability came to include a range of interrelated 
requirements, such as the guarantee of the water necessary to maintain human health and sustain 
ecosystems, basic protections for the renewability of water resources, and institutional improvements 
in terms of planning, management and equitable conflict resolution [1]. However, it is often the case 
that the translation of sustainability principles into action encounters major obstacles to breaking the 
link between economic growth and water demand [2] or to effectively coordinating sectoral and local 
interests with political and development pressures [3]. In response, regulatory institutions have been 
reformed in an attempt to integrate stakeholders and spatial areas, but these reforms have often failed 
to address a backlog of management distortions and social inequalities [4]. There is a growing 
appreciation that water sustainability is, ultimately, a contested concept, and as such requires concerted 
efforts towards forming a shared vision about the management of „socialised‟ water systems [5]. The 
current article makes use of a case study in the Baixada Fluminense to illustrate the influence of 
historical trends and discuss the persistence of institutional weaknesses that limit the achievement of 
more sustainable patterns of water management. The empirical results will demonstrate that, due to a 
chaotic urban growth, water sustainability is inextricably linked to a lack of opportunities for local 
populations to influence the decision-making process. 
Participation is certainly one of the fundamental pillars of the water sustainability agenda. Not only 
has the understanding of water sustainability been greatly augmented, but the purpose of stakeholder 
participation has also evolved in the last decades. In contrast to the rigid water infra-structure 
programmes after the Second World War, when the construction of large dams and irrigation schemes 
was overseen by centralised and technocratic agencies, there has been evident change towards more 
inclusive and flexible mechanisms. In its beginnings in the 1970s, public participation was taken as a 
facilitator of project implementation or a useful tool in the production of EIA reports. Later, public 
involvement evolved to play a more direct role in the repair of ecological degradation [6] and in the 
provision of better water services [7]. The 1992 Dublin Statement, the bedrock of contemporary water 
governance, ascertains that “water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels” [8]. Public participation, in its 
various formats and strategies, is closely associated with the discourse of environmental governance, 
for which the involvement of stakeholders can secure greater social commitment, minimise 
controversy and operational delays, and even create a „civil culture‟ [9,10]. Modern regulation, such as 
the EU Water Framework Directive, posits public participation not as an objective in itself, but 
something that helps to define the rationale, framework, outcomes and validity of decision-making 
processes. Admittedly, there is yet limited agreement on the practical meaning and actual implications 




of participatory water management [11], but it is difficult today to accept policy documents or official 
guidance that are not first subjected, at least, to public consultation or some form of stakeholder 
scrutiny. 
Currently there are several techniques used to structure the involvement of the public, such as 
„multi-stakeholder platforms‟ (a roundtable that facilitates the dialogue between different stakeholder 
positions [12]), „participatory multi-criteria decision analysis‟ (meetings that bring together public 
officials, elected politicians and local residents to jointly develop criteria to address a particular 
question [13]) and „citizen‟s juries‟ (where a group of community representatives are invited to attend 
a series of meetings to listen and cross-examine expert witness and respond to specific policy questions 
[14]). Nonetheless, it is debatable how much these types of approaches have really helped to move 
water use and environmental conservation into a more sustainable direction [15]. To date, the trend of 
environmental problems and widespread suffering due to water degradation have not only persisted, 
but actually increased since the adoption of more participatory strategies, which often tend to 
romanticise grassroots movement without providing sensible answers to mounting management 
dilemmas. The World Resources Institute insists that “[g]rowing water scarcity and alarming declines 
in the health of aquatic ecosystems indicate that water policies in most nations are failing to protect 
life‟s most vital resource: freshwater” (the full assessment of the World Resources Institute, including 
country water statistics, can be found at: http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db). This continued 
deterioration suggests the existence of ingrained institutional barriers that hinder the adoption of more 
effective procedures for overcoming the current unsustainability of managed water systems. To a large 
extent, this continuation of unsustainable trends stems from a failure to engage local stakeholders in a 
critical evaluation and effective resolution of collective problems. It is not enough to congregate people 
around a table to establish helpful alliances and partnerships, particularly when water is scarce or 
environmental degradation is extensive. Recent attempts have failed to incorporate the full complexity 
of social interaction and deal with the hierarchy of opportunities that affect the use and conservation of 
water.  
Cooke and Kothari criticise the limits of conventional participatory approaches, such as those 
associated with regional and national development programmes, for ignoring the imbalance of power 
between local stakeholders and government agencies or multilateral organisations [16]. The formalist 
management of natural resources often interprets public participation as linear, cumulative and 
politically neutral, with a tendency to override existing decision-making mechanisms and reinforce the 
interests of the already powerful [17]. It maintains a rigid or preconceived understanding of social 
interactions, normally neglecting issues of group identity and political asymmetries. But it is power 
inequalities that determine how natural and cultural categories are incorporated into water regulatory 
institutions and influence decisions about management priorities and the allocation of resources [18]. 
This exercise of power can operate invisibly in the resolution of water conflicts through the skilful use 
of hard and soft forms of hegemony that influences stakeholder interaction and decision-making [19]. 
The political hegemony of some water user sectors is consolidated and contested through everyday 
activities, fought over through lived environments and the confrontation of particular worldviews [20]. 
Water management is inseparable from issues of state politics, power dynamics and the asymmetric 




relation between social groups, which are factors that can only be properly addressed though 
democratic forms of public participation.  
As pointed out by Anand, at the heart of water disputes are questions related to justice and fairness, 
which are directly connected to how citizens perceive and articulate their water claims [21]. 
Nonetheless, participation is still too often promoted without properly considering the hydro-social and 
spatial arrangements that underpin the origin of the environmental management problems. The very 
nature of the recruitment to take part in meetings and committees eliminates the less organised 
stakeholder groups [22], because the process can be controlled by more influential participants, who 
share some common attributes and are more familiarised with the rules [23]. It is normally the case that 
government officers are not disposed to devolve power to lower levels, which means that the 
participation of local people in water management becomes little more than a passive and pointless 
consultation [24]. Therefore, a genuine discussion of the challenges related to water sustainability 
should take into account the technical, managerial and political dimension of water management, 
exploring stakeholder demands and power disputes in the contested arenas of policy-making and public 
participation. What is missing in most of the environmental debate today is an acceptance of the 
transformative role of public participation, not only as an element of improved decision-making, but 
the cornerstone of active citizenship and environmental justice [25]. The next section presents the 
results of a case study in Brazil, where the interface between power, state and space have determined 
the achievements and failures of water management approaches. Such notions have been amply 
discussed in the water sustainability and political ecology literature. As the following case will show, 
however, they are also helpful for thinking about the difficulty to translate participative, integrated 
water management theory into practice, particularly when issues of technocracy and political inequality 
are ignored in the reform of water management institutions. 
 
2. A Case Study of Water Unsustainability in the Baixada Fluminense 
 
2.1. Research Methods and Methodological Approach  
 
The challenges involved in the contemporary search for water sustainability can only be properly 
understood through a combination of theoretical and empirical investigation. Our research focused on 
water management and river restoration in an impoverished urban area called Baixada Fluminense, 
situated to the north of the city of Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil. The aim of the study was to compare and 
contrast past interventions with current water projects and ongoing changes in the institutional 
framework. The research followed an inductive and interdisciplinary approach that allowed a synthesis 
of natural and social processes associated with water management. As proposed by O‟Riordan, the 
assessment of environmental sustainability is fundamentally a process of connecting and revealing the 
multiple causes of environmental questions [26]. The materiality of social and natural problems was 
analysed in relation to the subjective circumstances of social action, as much as in relation to the 
objective influences of higher structures [27]. The paradigm guiding the research was critical realism 
[28] and grounded theory [29] was used as the key methodological tool. Critical realism recognises that 
the selection of a method depends on a careful consideration of the interrelations of the objects under 




study, which have emergent powers and cannot be simply reduced to their constituents. The theory of 
critical realism recommends that the research should include an intense „immersion‟ in the world in 
order to understand difference and stratification. As recommended by Sayer, realist explanation in 
social sciences emerges from the intensive study of the dialectical movement from the abstract (the 
isolation of particular attributes and relationships from the whole) and the concrete (the articulation 
between events, mechanisms and structures that comprise the world) [28]. Following a grounded 
theory procedure, data collection and analysis were concomitant processes, which enabled the capture 
of all potentially relevant aspects as soon as they were perceived. Hypotheses were developed and 
verified as much as possible during the research campaign, making use of constant comparisons and 
building the processes back into the theory. Sampling proceeded also on theoretical grounds with a 
systematic investigation of incidents, events, and happenings, but also addressing broader structural 
conditions that create and feed water management problems.  
In order to understand the barriers and potentialities of involving local actors in the improvement of 
water management, our study followed an inductive strategy that tried to compose a synthesis of 
multifarious processes associated with water use and management in a specific geographical context. 
Preliminary visits and attendance to open meetings started in 2007, but the bulk of the fieldwork took 
place between May and December 2008. In total, 44 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
local residents, water abstractors, and municipal, state and federal authorities. All interviews were later 
transcribed and only the most relevant parts were translated into English. During the period of research 
(2007-2008), it was possible to maintain regular contact with some key interviewees, which allowed 
the researchers to register changes in perception and attitudes through time. The preparation of 
interviews and field trips followed the recommendation that overall research questions should be 
subdivided into secondary questions and then related and cross-referenced to relevant issues [30]. Each 
interview topic comprised a cluster of points related to the management of water in the Baixada and 
were identified according to the methodical scrutiny of relevant documentation and government 
databases. The research effort also included regular visits to the communities more seriously affected 
by water problems, as well as participant observation in meetings and public events (i.e. river basin 
committee and other discussion forums, public hearings related to a river restoration project, election 
campaign events, etc.). In addition, the study dedicated special attention to the performance of the key 
organisations responsible for water management and regulation, namely, the water agency (SERLA; it 
should be mentioned that in January 2009, SERLA was merged with other agencies and is now part of 
the State Environment Institute, INEA), the water utility (CEDAE), local authorities and the river basin 
committee. The investigation was complemented with the content analysis of public policies and the 
systematic consultation of newspaper material, technical archives and university libraries. Throughout 
the study, the researchers tried to be as reflexive as possible, following the observation of Sarewitz that 
the responsibility of the scientist should expand from doing the right thing as an individual, to 
participating in the reflexive process of creating institutional consciousness, which demands a radical 
shift away from the constricting notion of science as an „autonomous republic‟, to embrace the 
realization that science and society are moving together in an „intimate coevolution‟ [31]. As a result, 
the science of sustainability cannot avoid questions about the social responsibility of academics and 
how to secure a more equal and just society. 




2.2. The Area of Study and the Local Water Problems 
 
Eight municipalities form the Baixada Fluminense (Duque de Caxias, Mesquita, Nova Iguaçu, 
Belford Roxo, Nilópolis, São João de Meriti, Queimados and Japeri), but to most Brazilians, the 
Baixada Fluminense is an area equally associated with violence, deprivation and the bizarre behaviour 
of some of its politicians. This stereotypical image, constantly reinforced by the mass media, certainly 
conceals the full extent of a complex web of interactions between local people and the territory where 
they live. The use and management of water epitomises some important aspects of the dynamic and 
contested exchanges between social groups and their environment. As the name implies – Baixada 
means Lowlands – this is a flat floodplain area under tidal influence and formed by the rivers that drain 
to the western side of the Guanabara Bay. It is revealing to observe that „fluminense‟ comes from the 
Latin „flumen‟, which means river. The main hydrological system, which was the main focus of our 
investigation, includes the Iguaçu River and its tributary the Sarapuí River (Figure 1), a catchment that 
occupies around 700 km
2
 or 53% of the area of the municipalities that form the Baixada. A small 
proportion of the Iguaçu River Basin is located in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, therefore beyond 
the Baixada Fluminense. Perhaps ironically today, „Iguaçu‟, in the indigenous language, means „plenty 
of water‟.  
 
Figure 1. Location of the Iguaçu River Basin in the State of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. 
 




Historically, the Baixada evolved as an appendix of the city of Rio de Janeiro, the former capital of 
the country. Since the early colonial times, local alluvial soils were explored to cultivate sugar cane 
and subsistence crops. The river network facilitated the commercialisation of local produce and served 
as a transport corridor for gold and, later, coffee brought from the inland. The use of Baixada as a 
passage area was later reinforced with the construction of the first Brazilian railway in the mid-19th 
century (the railway network included the Dom Pedro II Railway in 1858, followed in 1883 by the 
Príncipe do Grão-Pará and the Rio do Ouro Railways – the latter was built to transport water to the 
City of Rio – and the Norte Railway, constructed between 1886 and 1888) and the São Paulo-Rio de 
Janeiro Highway in the mid-20th century. The availability of public transport attracted a great influx of 
immigrants (mainly from the Northern provinces) that arrived in search of jobs and opportunities. After 
several decades with very high rates of immigration (which peaked to around 10% per year in the 
1950s and 1960s), the total population reached 3.2 million in 2007 (population data from IBGE 
statistics, available at www.ibge.gov.br). 
It was mainly the arrival of a large contingent of migrants to an area with limited public infra-
structure (other than the public transport to take them to the workplace) that deeply shaped the recent 
history and the geography of the Baixada. Incoming residents were forced to occupy any piece of land 
available and transformed a rural wetland into a highly populated periphery of the large metropolis. 
The majority of the poorest migrants could only afford to live in the more flood-prone terrains and 
along the river courses. A system of polders and dikes was introduced in the 1930s to reclaim land for 
agriculture (i.e. which means relatively less flood protection than equivalent systems designed for 
urban drainage), but the floodplains were soon engulfed by the dramatic pace of urban expansion [32], 
as can be seen in Figure 2. Following the inauguration of an oil refinery in 1961, numerous industries, 
particularly chemical and petrochemical, were installed in the Baixada. The overall consequences of 
this fast pace of transformation is that, except in the headwaters, the Iguaçu River and its tributaries 
now show severe levels of pollution and degradation, especially due to faecal coliform, depleted 
oxygen, and heavy metal contamination of sediments [33]. There are also additional pressures related 
to the removal of riparian vegetation, uncollected waste, and impermeabilisation of urban surfaces 
[34].  
Due to intense manipulation of the land and rivers, there has been a dramatic shift from a situation 
of water abundance to the current condition of (man-made) water scarcity. In effect, the Baixada was 
converted from being a water exporter to Rio de Janeiro (in the 19th century) to a net importer of 90% 
of its water demands (by the end of the 20th century). Most of the water distributed in the Baixada now 
comes from the Guandu River (in the west of the Metropolitan Region), which first has its flow 
significantly increased by a transfer of water from the Paraíba do Sul River Basin. The transfer of water 
may not be a problem in itself, at least to the receiving sites, but in the case of the Baixada it results in 
a highly unreliable water supply system, given that the abstraction from the Guandu River was 
primarily designed to serve the city of Rio de Janeiro. It means that the Baixada receives excess water 
from Rio de Janeiro, which creates constant problems of intermittency and, because of the precarious 
status of the pipeline, water quality below the desired threshold. As described below, several water 
works recently constructed in the area (especially through the PDBG programme) still remain out of 




operation due to bad project design, incomplete infra-structure and malfunctioning of the distribution 
network.  
 




2.3. The Difficult Dialogue between the Population and Official Agencies 
 
The transformation of the river system according to urban and regional development pressures 
produced an uneven pattern of impacts and outcomes, which regularly re-emerges in the form of 
conflicts and disputes. One of the first court cases involving the protection of water rights in Brazil 
happened in 1886 between local landowners and tradesmen around the construction of bridges over the 
Iguaçu and Sarapuí Rivers [35]. Their claim was based on a number of decrees that protected river 
navigation and required bridges to follow certain standards that were not being observed. It took until 
1898, with a succession of appeals, for a final decision from the high court ordering the demolition of 
the bridge and restoration of pre-existing navigation conditions. In the end, it was a pyrrhic victory, 
given that river transportation soon entered into decline with the preference for rail as a form of 
transport. A recent „map‟ of environmental conflicts listed 28 of water-related disputes in the 
municipalities of Baixada involving river contamination, industrial leakage, inadequate disposal of 
toxic material, poor rubbish collection and landfill operation, urban flooding and various failures of 
public water supply [36]. As conceded by the authors of this assessment, that figure is probably an 
underestimation of a much larger number of water-related conflicts. The most illustrative case was 
related to a series of accidents and soil and water contamination affecting the Sarapuí River caused by 
a large chemical industry in Belford Roxo. Local residents started to complain in 1992 about the 




careless operation of the company and the case quickly escalated to involve the public attorney, 
international activists and scientists from Exeter University. After a long list of reports and visits, an 
agreement was reached in 2002 to give the company the opportunity to improve its performance; 
moreover, there are doubts about actual compliance. Water conflicts are rarely referred to the courts, 
especially because the judiciary system is onerous and beyond reach for the majority of the population, 
who can only resort to assistance by the public attorney‟s office [Ministério Público]. After the 1988 
Constitution, public attorneys became legally responsible for environmental management issues and 
the protection of public health in Brazil, but in the majority of the cases when public attorneys were 
involved there was no conclusive decision due the difficulty to legally prove the responsibility for 
environmental infractions. In the Baixada, an additional constraint is the fact that those who have their 
houses illegally built on public land are reluctant to present formal complaints given the risk of losing 
their homes [37]. 
Another major source of controversy between local residents and governmental agencies is related 
to water scarcity and lack of basic sanitation. For many years, researchers have identified a deficient 
water supply as the main problem affecting the quality of life of the local population [38]. According to 
the national sanitation statistics bureau (www.snis.gov.br) around 71% of the population has access to 
water supply and only 28% is served by public sanitation (additional statistics for the Baixada 
Fluminense related to the year 2006: average household demand = 23 m
3
/month; per capita water use = 
0.205 m
3
/day; rate of leakage = 54%). Those not officially served by mains water (i.e. 29% of the 
population) rely on a combination of boreholes, water tanks, help from neighbours and unauthorised 
connections to the public network (it is often the case that a group of residents, without being 
authorised by the water utility, collectively divert and distribute treated water among themselves). 
There exists an exceptionally difficult relation between the public water utility (CEDAE) and its 
customers, with frustration on both sides. One the one hand, the company has had a low investment 
capacity to expand service coverage; on the other, a significant proportion of the service is 
unaccounted for due to water thieving and lack of payment. Customers complain that the minimal 
payment for water service (the so called „social tariff‟) is significantly higher in Rio de Janeiro than in 
other parts of Brazil, which certainly contributes to the high rate of unpaid debt: CEDAE (Rio de 
Janeiro): R$ 30 for 15 m
3
/month; DMAE (Porto Alegre): R$ 7.5 for 10 m
3
/month and SABESP (São 
Paulo): R$ 4.42 for 10 m
3
/month (all 2008 data). Residents interviewed in July 2008 provided a vivid 
illustration of the problem: 
 
“Our [water] service is in the ITU [intensive treatment unit]. (…) When it rains, my street becomes a river. 
Fresh water then mixes with sewage, it is really difficult. (…) The problem gets worse because the population 
is always increasing; the last investment in pipelines here was in 1986”. 
 
“Water supply is very precarious. There is only water when it rains. (…) The company [CEDAE] only 
charges, but doesn‟t deliver. They sent me a bill for water they never supplied. (…) That is why many people 
steel water from the pipelines here. (…) But you go and check if the wealthy neighbourhoods in Rio don‟t have 
good and constant water. Why is it like that?” (see Figure 3) 




“It is really chaotic here, but the population understands very little of public policies. (…) The water meter 
is here to steal us; some people pay, others don‟t pay, but they are afraid that when they go to sell their property 
the debt will be charged, with interest and all of that. (…) I don‟t like paternalism, paternalistic policies, some 
are now paying for the mistake of others”.  
 
Figure 3. Resident receiving water bills, but no water supply. 
 
 
There are cases when the population appealed to the judicial system to see a normalisation of water 
supply, as happened in the neighbourhood „K-11‟ in Nova Iguaçu, an area that has suffered from lack 
of adequate water for more than 50 years. With the support of a local NGO, various neighbourhoods 
associations brought the case to the public attorney in 2003, which forced CEDAE to provide a formal 
explanation and promised specific investments to address the problem (still inconclusive in 2008). 
However, there have also been situations where the tough cost recovery policy of CEDAE led to 
intimidation and sudden cancellation of water supply. It has happened, for example, in various 
communities in the municipality of S.J. Meriti, where the local residents formed a commission and 
requested assistance from a public defender lawyer [Defensor Público], who stated that: 
 
“This is a problem created by the water company itself. For years, CEDAE failed to charge for the water 
supply and then decides to recover the entire debt at once. In many cases, because of the low value of the 




properties, the debt is equivalent to half of the market value of the house. That creates a lot of anxiety among 
people about losing the family house. (…) Our work is to treat each case individually and according to the 
specific circumstances, but I am aware of cases where the company acted illegally, beyond the law, in terms of 
notification and deadlines. There are also areas where the residents demanded the installation of water meters, 
because the volumetric payment is likely to be lower than the „social tariff‟, but CEDAE refuses to do it. (…) In 
other cases the company discriminates between residents with legal land tenure and those in illegal settlements. 
However, we understand that, according to the new national Sanitation Law [passed in 2007] the water services 
have to be universalised, all should be served, and the company cannot discriminate. In comparison, the 
electricity and the telephone companies don‟t make any distinction in terms of land tenure” (interviewer with 
public defender lawyer, 31 Jul 2008). Observation: the matter is debatable, because the state legislation, 
apparently contradicting the federal law, determines that the debt should be related to the property not the 
customer. 
 
Although the water problems – pollution, flooding and deficient water services – are well known 
and repeatedly mentioned in plans and official reports [39], the solution seems to be continually 
beyond the possibilities of the public authorities. This persistent dilemma and, crucially, the related 
political exploitation of the water-related problems, lie at the heart of water management in the 
Baixada. Limited financial resources are not enough to explain the precariousness of the water 
services, high rates of insalubrity and recurrent flooding, particularly considering that between 1975 
and 2000, around US$ 1.5 billion was invested in water infra-structure in the area [40,41]. It suggests 
that the underlying question is not one of lack of funds or technical capacity, but the selective 
allocation of resources combined with deficient urban planning and use of the public funds according 
to political priorities. Summarised by the expression „pipelines against votes‟ this paradigm is typical 
of the many public initiatives so far a phenomenon that Porto describes as „pipelinism‟ [manilhamento] 
[40]. The discriminatory distribution of public funds is directly related to the ambiguities of local 
political disputes, which unfold through a volatile combination of violence and populism. Politicians 
are known for both expressing their concern for the suffering of the population and making use of 
public anguish for their electoral benefit [42]. Furthermore, the instability of political alliances in the 
municipal administrations has led to an emphasis on short-term goals and widespread evidences of 
corruption, which all affect the formulation of technical responses to water problems. It will be shown 
below that the truncated channels of communication with population, as well as the irregular and ill-
conceived interventions of public agencies and the absence of public accountability, have been 
common features of the recent history of water management in the Baixada Fluminense. Unfortunately, 
those distortions continue to prevent the achievement of higher levels of water sustainability.  
 
2.4. Government Interventions and Persistent Problems 
 
Because of the need to reclaim land to accommodate the accelerated process of urban expansion, 
there has been a constant endeavour to drain the wetland system and improve the salubriousness of the 
Baixada Fluminense. Initial land reclamation studies were conducted as early as in 1833 and the 
contamination of standing and running waters has always represented a serious public health issue 




[43]. For instance, in 1855, there was a cholera epidemic with significant death of slaves and, 
therefore, loss of capital (slavery was only abolished in 1888). In 1870 the provincial government took 
the initiative to clean and canalise some river stretches and laws were passed in 1888 to expand the 
drainage of the Iguaçu catchment [44]. After the proclamation of the republic in 1889, the Province 
Commission of Studies and Sanitation (1894) and the Federal Sanitation Commission of Baixada 
Fluminense (1909) were created to carry out drainage studies and localised works [43]. The 1930s and 
1940s – the first phase of the state-led industrialisation of Brazil – was a period of renewed efforts to 
drain and sanitise the area, but the rate of urban growth constantly overcame the response capacity of 
the federal and state governments. The situation was turned worse as the simple announcement of 
some form of infra-structure expansion triggered the occupation of new areas by more incoming 
migrants. During the military dictatorship (1964-1985) a national water supply and sanitation plan was 
launched in 1971 (PLANASA), but in the Baixada its implementation was turbulent and only led to 
some isolated pipeline and water distribution systems.  
With the return of democracy in the 1980s, there was a resurgence of popular mobilisation in the 
Baixada, particularly around the creation of neighbourhood associations and municipal federations of 
associations. The Political Committee of Sanitation of the Baixada Fluminense was established in 1984 
as a non-governmental forum for the dialogue between government authorities and representatives of 
local communities. Although this Political Committee is still operational today, its influence has 
declined dramatically due to both stakeholder demobilisation and repeated attempts from the state 
government to manipulate its members, often by catapulting them to paid jobs in the administration 
[40,45]. In 1984, the state government launched the Global Sanitation Plan (PEB), which included, 
among other innovations, the „condominial sewage‟, a cooperativised model of low-cost sanitation that 
relies on a close coordination between members of the community. Unfortunately, a constant tension 
between the state and federal administration impaired the implementation of the PEB: out of 576 km of 
pipelines planned, only 70 km were effectively installed. The overlapping of responsibilities between 
the three levels of administration was, and continues to be, a major obstacle to the resolution of water 
management problems. According to the national constitution, the responsibility for water supply and 
sanitation belongs to the municipal authorities, but in metropolitan areas, because of the 
interconnection of pipelines across neighbouring towns, the state administration becomes the main 
operator; although the legality of the state responsibility for metropolitan systems is, after many years 
of deliberation, still unresolved by the supreme court of Brazil. Despite the fact that legal responsibility 
is disputed between local and state authorities, the main source of investment is from the federal 
government, which obviously interferes in the final destination of resources, or from multilateral 
development agencies, which also requires federal approval. In practice, the cooperation between the 
different levels of public administration is never taken for granted, but depends on party affiliation and 
the convergence of political interests. That means a serious institutional instability and, in many cases, 
waste of public funds.  
The next state administration (i.e. after 1986) dropped the condominial technology and reduced the 
overall targets of PEB to 251 km, but even this objective was not achieved. In 1988, the project called 
„Reconstruction Rio‟ was launched in response to the major floods that affected the Baixada two years 
earlier and had a total budget of U$ 288 millions, mostly funded by the World Bank, to deal with 




sanitation, urban drainage and solid waste. However, only half of the budget was actually spent due to 
bureaucratic delays, transition to a new state government and limited integration between state and 
municipal administrations. Significant to note is the fact that project emphasis shifted in the early 
1990s with water problems of the Baixada starting to be described in more „scientific‟ terms, instead of 
simply responding to community mobilisation. A comprehensive hydrological study of the flooding 
problem was published in 1996, the Iguaçu Project, which called for investments of US$ 400 millions 
[34]. Because of its heavy budget, the Iguaçu Project was never implemented and only a subset of its 
targets was recently repackaged under a different name (PAC-SERLA, discussed next). In 1994, the 
most ambitious initiative was launched, the Guanabara Pollution Control Programme (PDBG), with 
total funds of US$ 860.5 millions (financed by the IADB and JBIC). PDBG included investments in 
sanitation and drainage in the whole metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro and for the Baixada it 
included seven new reservoirs (to serve a population of 575,000), two sewage treatment works (to 
serve an equivalent population), and drainage, planning, environmental restoration and education 
projects [46]. Despite the availability of funds, PDBG was marred by constant delays and was still not 
concluded in 2008. It was characterised by ill-conceived infra-structure projects that could not be easily 
connected to the existing pipeline system [47], as well as by an authoritarian relation with civil society 
and local authorities [48].  
From the above examples – just handful of a much longer list of projects and programmes – it 
should be easy to realise that the Baixada Fluminense has been at the receiving end of many water 
management initiatives related in the last 25 years. Even so, the trend of problems and conflicts around 
water management continues to intensify due to the arrival of additional migrants, the natural growth 
of the population and the lack of maintenance to existing water infra-structure. The irrationality of 
many projects, together with technocratic and centralised interventions, created a situation of low 
efficiency, wasted resources and large-scale informality (i.e. illegal connections to public mains). In 
our interviews, members of the public complained that their household problems were only 
remembered at the election campaigns and, in an emergency, all they can do is to plea to some local 
politicians, in exchange for votes in the next election:  
 
“You see, water has always been a very serious problem here. The population has to do whatever they can to 
overcome the problems, for example, in my street there is [public] supply only on Tuesdays and on Saturdays, 
for a few ours early in the morning. You have to wake up early and fill up the tank, if you miss it, you are left 
without water for many days. (…) Some people installed pumps and take water from boreholes or even from 
the pipeline, illegally… well, if you wait for CEDAE, you know… Another option, that has increased in the last 
few years with the demobilisation of the community, is to ask for a local councillor to send a water tank, in 
exchange for votes, of course. I can‟t prove, but everybody knows that they have a kind of parallel service to 
provide water. This operates using the very structure of the state, I mean, they control the water services and 
order to reconnect the supply [when it was cut] or to send a water tank… if you agree with their [political] 
demands…” (interview with a local school teacher, 06 July 2008).  
 
See Figure 4 for a queue of water tank lorries (trucks) waiting to be filled in the city of Duque de 
Caxias. In different opportunities we tried to interview the lorry drivers but they vehemently declined; 




various informants mentioned that most water tanks are paid by the water utility, which has to provide 
emergency supply when there are failures in their service (but obviously only to those legally 
connected to the pipelines) and that are also paid by politicians in exchange for votes (probably making 
unlawful use of public funds to pay for the service). 
 
Figure 4. Water tanks: where water supply and votes meet. 
 
 
Considering the sequence of projects and initiatives, it can be argued that the underlying trend is one 
of regular investments not in the resolution, but in the maintenance of water problems. The apparent 
contradiction between significant sums of money being invested and the widespread lack of care for 
the local communities can only be explained by considering the centralised and authoritarian 
formulation of investment programmes and, more importantly, because it is in the interest of 
hegemonic political groups. It is not technical incompetence or lack of resources that have perpetuated 
the water problem, but instead, that the continuation of poor water services creates favourable 
conditions for political patronage. The manipulation of public despair (such as by sending an 
emergency water tank) is a profitable electoral machine. At the same time, the constant formulation of 
new investment programmes reinforces the mandate of elected politicians and legitimises existing 
structures of power. Every four years a new governor takes seat, but the approach to water management 
problems in the Baixada remains remarkably unchanged.  
 
2.5. New Initiatives, the Same Unsustainable Trends 
 
As mentioned above, government action has continuously focused on the formulation of new 
programmes, often apportioning additional resources to the same location or dealing with the same 
infra-structure work that was left unfinished in a previous project. Before an intervention is even 
completed, a new „generation‟ of projects – normally launched by a different state administration to 
capitalise politically from the apparent novelty of the new project – is passed to occupy the water 
management agenda of the Baixada. For instance, since 2007, the latest round of water infra-structure 




investments was announced with funds from the national Programme to Accelerate Growth (PAC). 
The overall programme included US$ 370 million for urban drainage projects (funds transferred to the 
municipal authorities), US$ 100 million for water supply (under the responsibility of CEDAE, the state 
owned water utility) and US$ 135 million to restore watercourses in the Iguaçu Catchment (under the 
responsibility of SERLA, which at the time of our research was the state water regulator and water 
resources management agency). We assumed here an exchange rate of R$ 2.00 = US$ 1.00. The latter 
is called „PAC-SERLA‟ and corresponds to a reduced version of the aforementioned Iguaçu Project 
and its targets include river dredging, and revegetation and stabilisation of riverbanks (interventions 
worth US$ 97.5 million) and removal and resettlement of communities living along the river (US$ 
37.5 million). Part of those investments will be used to conclude unfinished works initiated in previous 
projects, such as connecting water and sewage treatment plants that were built under PDBG and are 
still out of operation.  
Because the goals of the PAC-SERLA project were focused on the Iguaçu catchment (i.e. the other 
projects funded by PAC don‟t have a similar spatial reference), its implementation received special 
attention during our fieldwork. See Figure 5 for an illustration of the location of the area of 
intervention of the PAC-SERLA project in Iguaçu River, in its tributary Sarapuí and in some other 
tributaries and sub-tributaries.  
 
Figure 5. Location of the interventions included in the PAC-SERLA project. 
 




The study of the PAC-SERLA project provided us with a unique opportunity to compare current 
practices with the past water projects from the perspective of water sustainability and public 
participation. For instance, the documentation of the project makes repeated reference to the 
„sustainable use of water‟ and the achievement of „environmental sustainability‟ [33], which confirms 
that these concepts that have been formally incorporated by local consultants and policy-makers. At its 
inauguration in July 2008 (just a few months before the local elections took place in October 2008, in 
which water was a critical electoral issue), governor Cabral declared it “an important work in the 
Baixada, which has the objective of saving [sic] people that live along the river and suffer from 
flooding” [49]. The governor claimed that 2.5 million people, the totality of the population living in the 
Iguaçu catchment, would benefit from the project, which was a gross exaggeration, later confirmed by 
civil servants (cf. interview with a coordinator of PAC-SERLA project, 07 Jul 2008), given that the 
interventions are restricted to selected river stretches. 
In an attempt to respond to the growing demands for participation, two percent of the overall 
budget of PAC-SERLA was allocated to so-called „social targets‟, which included services provided by 
a non-governmental organisation that was hired by the water regulator (SERLA) to mobilise the local 
population. The contract was for US$ 600,000 and the NGO service provider was selected by 
negotiation instead of open tender (i.e. even before the contract was signed, many of our informants 
were already aware of the winner). In confidential interviews, many professionals involved in this 
process expressed their inconformity and uneasiness with the overall direction of the service they were 
hired to deliver. On the personal level, some questioned the purpose of their work, given that they “live 
an incredible contradiction, all the time preparing projects and not having time to get engaged in the 
political movement” (interview with a think-tank activist, Jul. 2008). Interviews with the residents also 
confirmed the resentment of the local population with this rigid agenda of public mobilisation, as a 
lady put:  
 
“... They are making a lot of money and are trying hard to make our community accept and like the 
approaches used by SERLA; these guys come here with „sophisticated‟ [a sense of irony in her voice] 
techniques to persuade the population. (…) But we are not stupid; this is the same technical staff of the New 
Baixada Programme that came here and made loads of promises. (…) We decided not to cooperate before they 
can show us a detailed programme of work and the engineering project” (interview with a resident of the Lote 
XV neighbourhood, Dec. 2008). 
 
On of the most controversial aspects of the PAC-SERLA is the removal of more than 2,300 low-
income families (around 10,000 persons) in order to make space for the machinery that will be needed 
to dredge the rivers. The aim is to resettle those directly affected in new flats (purportedly „eco-
friendly‟ units) still to be constructed, therefore requiring temporary accommodation in yet unknown 
locations [33]. Our fieldwork coincided with the organisation of open meetings with the population 
and the surveillance of those impacted by the removal. The inspection of households was done by 
social workers hired by a local NGO, which had been contracted by construction companies that 
provide service to the government. In all meetings, civil servants and consultants routinely arrived 1 or 
2 hours later than the announced time and gave a standard PowerPoint presentation with only generic 




information about the project. The activities followed a conference style, where the authorities were 
not prepared to answer specific questions about the impacts of the project on the community (Figure 
6). The overall impression of the audience was that the meetings contributed little to improving 
awareness about the implementation of the project.  
 
Figure 6. Public meetings during the implementation of the PAC-SERLA project. 
 
 
In any case, the lack of detail didn‟t seem to concern those in charge of the meetings: on the 
contrary, they emphasised that “in the dictatorship, people were removed without any consultation, but 
now it is totally different” (mentioned in a public meeting on 10 Nov 2008). However, most of our 
interviews with residents, especially in the day immediately after the meetings – when people still had 
a clear recollection of the events – demonstrated a growing uneasiness about the project and a high 
level of uncertainty. When confronted with our evidences of the shortcomings of the participatory 
strategy underpinning the project, civil servants argued that “the project deadlines must be met” and 
there was limited time for dialogue with the public. However, the technical details of the Iguaçu 
Project were still being developed and had only recently received the environmental licence from the 
environmental agency (FEEMA, responsible for nature conservation and protected areas, now 
incorporated into the new state environmental institute, INEA), which seems to undermine the claim 
for urgency.  
It is fundamental to realise that members of the public not just resisted the river restoration project 
in the light of bad previous experiences in the last decades (which are vividly present in their 
memories), but its implementation seems to repeat, under a superficial discourse of public participation 
and sustainable water management, the vices of earlier approaches. The most common objection 
among the residents affected by the river restoration project (i.e. PAC-SERLA) was the fact that only 
some of the families will be compensated for damage to or destruction of their houses, but the 
allocation of compensation was not yet decided. Note that there is no compensation for the loss of land, 




since these are irregular settlements. Nonetheless, managers and engineers continually complain about 
the „bad‟ environmental behaviour of the local population and their unreasonable resistance to fully 
accepting the new water infra-structure project. As mentioned by a project manager: 
 
“In the end of the day, we can‟t say that the project [PAC-SERLA] is really going to be different or better 
than the previous projects. (...) Our goal here is to initiate a process that leads to the solution; all we can do is to 
concentrate on the larger rivers and work on one riverbank only, because money is limited. (...) The resistance 
of the public [to house reallocation] is natural; we are not sailing on a sea of roses. Any change is not natural. 
Nature is cyclical and continuous, so if you change something, this is against nature. It is not that the human 
beings are apathetic, but it is their nature to want to keep things as before. The Moon moves round the Earth, 
and that doesn‟t change (...) The person has been living there for many years, so it is not easy to agree to move. 
But we need to intervene in order to reduce flooding. These people are living in an area along the river that it is 
supposed to be permanently protected. (...) It is not possible for the public agencies to enforce the legislation, it 
is very difficult in such large and overcrowded areas. That is why our project is going to remove the population 
and built roads along the river to avoid new invasions” (interview with a manager of PAC-SERLA project, 29 
Jul 2008). 
 
But the population seems to have a different view about the project, which is illustrated here:  
 
“They are not dealing with numbers, but with human beings. The people are being ignored. (…) The 
Political Committee of Sanitation has simply not been involved in the debate and this is the main arena of 
debate [for water supply and sanitation]. They have to understand. They [the government] should come here, 
learn about our personal history, our problems, family, daily tragedy. (...) But that is never important for them” 
(interview with a local resident, 22 Jul 2008). 
  
Despite the importance of addressing the flooding problem in the Baixada, the implementation of 
the new project seems to closely follow the same centralised, top-down approach of previous 
programmes. As a member of a neighbourhood association in Duque de Caxias complained in a 
meeting in September 2008, “the various interventions funded by PAC were thrown upon us in a 
finished, closed version, with no room for discussion”. In particular, the open meetings organised to 
inform the population about the objectives of the PAC-SERLA project didn‟t seem to achieve a 
successful result and residents complained that “they were tired of listening” and “wanted to be 
listened to”. With months of meetings that contributed little to clarify this situation, there was a clear 
deterioration in the quality of the dialogue between civil servants, consultants and the local residents 
impacted by the flood defence project. The initial uneasiness about the lack of clarity on the details of 
the river restoration project gradually turned into a widespread opposition. For example, during the 
surveillance, social workers put a sign on the houses supposed to be demolished, but some residents 
started to erase those marks on the front doors and replaced with the sentence: “we are not moving”. It 
was possible to gauge a particular level of tension in a meeting in November 2008, when some 
members of the audience verbally attacked the civil servants conducting the activities and nearly 
reached physical aggression. At that point, it became evident that both sides were no longer 




communicating to each other: on the one hand there were civil servants and consultants using their 
usual PowerPoint presentation to emphasise the „wonders‟ of the project; on the other hand, the 
population repeatedly complaining about scanty information, the lack of involvement of local 
authorities and the uncertain compensation for the damage on their houses. The most recent responses 
to old water problems have not only failed to improve the understating of local socionatural conditions, 
but also deepened the level of distrust between catchment communities and government agencies.  
 
2.6. The Timid Contribution of the River Basin Committee 
 
Against the background of persistent institutional distortion and water management problems 
described above, the introduction of a new regulatory framework through the 1999 state water law 
(Law 3239) was received with great expectations. The state legislation follows the principles of the 
federal law (9,433/1997) and both were influenced by the doctrine of integrated water management and 
environmental sustainability. That is translated into various articles of state law that define water as a 
public and finite good with economic value; it also states that drinking water has the highest priority 
among multiple uses, that the watershed is the basic spatial unit for planning and management, and that 
social actors should participate actively in decentralised management. Essentially, the new legislation 
meant a shift from supply augmentation alone to the management of demand according to multiple 
uses and the economic value of water [50]. Water users are now expected to apply for a licence before 
they can abstract water or discharge effluent; these licences attract fees and charges equivalent to the 
level of impact (i.e. bulk water charges based on the „polluter-pays‟ principle). Finally, under the new 
regulatory regime, river basin committees are supposed to approve long-term plans and resolve 
conflicts (based on the principle of subsidiarity).  
Despite its ambitious goals, the implementation of the new legal framework in many parts of Brazil 
has been marked by delays and inconsistencies [4], but the situation in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan 
Area has been particularly problematic and more controversial than in other states. The controversy 
started with the formation of the local river basin committee: instead of establishing its own forum, the 
Baixada was incorporated into responsibilities of the Guanabara Bay Committee, which covers all river 
basins that drain to the Guanabara Bay and two independent lacustrian systems (the full name is 
“Committee of the Hydrographical Region of Guanabara Bay and Lake Systems of Maricá and 
Jacarepaguá”). Following the new legislation, the Guanabara Bay Committee received powers of 
deliberation, oversight, planning and establishment of a water tariff scheme, whilst the state 
government, through the state water regulator (SERLA), retains control over issuing water use permits 
and collecting water use charges. Collected charges are then transferred to the committee and used 
according to an operational plan approved the State Water Council (which is a branch of the state 
administration with representatives of water users and civil society). The Guanabara Bay Committee 
has 60 seats, 20 distributed between the public sector (17 are seats taken by municipal, 2 by state and 1 
by federal authorities), 20 distributed between water users (12 taken by industry representatives) and 20 
distributed between civil society representatives (7 taken by organisations of the Baixada Fluminense). 
However, the appointment and replacing of committee members has been ambiguous and open for 
dispute, particularly because only entities that are formally associated with environmental questions are 




eligible to participate in the committee. Because of that, grassroots organisations, such as community 
associations and other entities with legitimate interest in taking part in the committee activities, have 
been prevented from being elected (interview with NOG activist, 05 Jul 2008). It should be noted that 
the Guanabara Bay Committee is part of the new water regulatory framework and, for that reason, it 
did not incorporate the aforementioned Political Committee of Sanitation of the Baixada Fluminense. 
Weak as it may be, the Political Committee remains an independent forum of popular representation 
that is focused on water supply and sanitation issues. 
More important, the formation of the Guanabara Bay Committee was not the outcome of a bottom-
up process, but was unilaterally imposed by the governor in 2005 (Decree 38,260/2005), which 
contradicted the fragile mobilisation that had started to emerge, since 2001, in the east and west 
sections of the Bay. There has been some limited reaction to this distortion, such as a meeting called by 
some activists in December 2008, but its outcome is still uncertain. At the same time the committee 
was forced upon the communities of the Guanabara Bay, the government commissioned a master plan 
that provided an overview of resources and management options [39]. The simultaneous constitution of 
the committee by gubernatorial decree and the imposition of a master plan, neither of which had been 
previously discussed with the water stakeholders, could only elicit serious resentment from them. The 
already questionable legitimacy of the new representative forum was further increased by the erratic 
agenda of meetings and the tone of the internal debates. For example, in a meeting the president of the 
committee complained that local water management problems were missed by the committee while 
local water users continue to act as if the committee didn‟t exist (cf. committee meeting, 08 Nov 2007). 
In another meeting, there was a strong complaint about the lack of interest among many governmental 
and non-governmental organisations, which never nominate representatives to take seat in the 
committee (cf. committee meeting, 13 Mar 2008). Growing tension and disagreement about its 
political direction led to the resignation of the president of the Guanabara Bay Committee (Mrs 
Negreiros), only a week after giving us an interview. Interestingly, the new president expressed a 
position that was clearly more amenable to government interventions and less concerned with the 
environmental impacts of current development plans, mentioned below (interview on 07 Jul 2008).  
The maelstrom about the composition and activities of the Guanabara Bay Committee are related to 
the broader disputes regarding the introduction of bulk water charges in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The 
requirement to charge all water users was one of the pillars of the 1999 legislation, but it was only in 
2003 that a specific law introduced a charging mechanism (Law 4247), surprisingly approved by the 
state assembly of deputies with minimal parliamentarian debate. The most controversial part of the 
2003 legislation was its Article 24, which forbade the transference of bulk water charges to the 
customers of public utilities. Although the state water utility (CEDAE) is responsible for around 80% 
of the income from the bulk water charges, it refused to make any payment if that could not be 
transferred to its business and household clients. The bizarre rebellion of a state-owned utility against 
its own government persisted till the current state administration, who proposed an amendment to 
Article 24. That eventually became the state law 5234/2008, whose text allows the transference of bulk 
water charges to the utility customers and, therefore, preserves the interests of CEDAE. At the time of 
our fieldwork, CEDAE hadn‟t yet started to make the payments, because of the pending negotiation 
about the backlog of unpaid bills. 




Despite all the controversy, the revenues from bulk water charges are unlikely to provide a 
significant contribution to the Baixada, given that most of the water used there is imported from 
another river system (the Guandu River Basin), where the abstraction charges should be paid and 
reverted to the respective river basin committee. Regardless of the level of income, the destination of 
the revenues of water charges is already a source of internal anxiety in the Guanabara Bay Committee, 
even before CEDAE starts making its payment. Several members of the committee mentioned in the 
interviews that the decisions about where and how to allocate the resources are non transparent. As 
mentioned by one interviewee:  
 
“The discussion [about the destination of committee funds] is very confusing, with the simultaneous, but 
cumbersome, analysis of various items (…). There are no criteria. The executive managers present their 
decisions about where the money will be spent and that was it. Done. I try to open the debate, discuss the 
priorities before deciding where to put the money. But those in charge of the meeting never accept that. It is 
clear that they had a political agenda and want to impose it” (interview with a think-tank activist and member of 
the Guanabara Bay Committee, 22 Jul. 2008). 
 
In reality, the activities of the Guanabara Bay committee have so far offered little contribution to 
improve the overall management of water and to restore the environmental condition of the rivers of 
Baixada. A decade after its introduction, the new institutional framework is still too feeble to intervene 
in the formulation of policies and implementation of projects, which makes the state system of water 
management little more than a „figment‟ [51]. Maybe the fundamental cause of the institutional 
weakness of the new committee can be related to the observation of a former member of the 
committee, who mentioned that 
 
 “Our overall aim is the sustainability of the [water] resource, but it is not easy to keep distance between the 
government and the river basin committee, which often means an interference in the direction of the committee 
activities” (interview with industry representative, 01 Aug 2008).  
 
That was corroborated by a current member of the committee, who thinks that at the same time that 
some senior members of the government have been responsible for strengthening the formal structure 
of the committee, there is limited delegation of responsibilities and power sharing (cf. interview with 
sanitation engineer, 15 Jul 2008). Other informant even mentioned that: 
 
“The new committee is formally, according to the legislation, the best instrument to supervise, monitor all 
these projects, but it is failing terribly. I can mention a number of moments that the population protested here, 
but the committee is unable to incorporate, canalise that in an effective manner. Even when they take interest, 
there is no continuity (interview with political activist, 18 Jul 2008).  
 
The failures of the new institutional framework, in particular the activities of the river basin 
committee, are not only circumstantial problems, but reflect the long legacy of power asymmetry, lack 
of public accountability and capture of public agency by the stronger groups. This is consistent with the 




observation that participatory forums established to deal with water issues in Brazil have recreated the 
regional political context, acting as an extension of the party political game rather than areas of 
stakeholder negotiation [52]. The overall performance of the river committee was summarised by a 
NGO activist that regularly attend the meetings as an observer: 
 
“No public debate is being promoted. I mean, there is limited consciousness of the need to have a 
democratic management of water; also the river basin perspective is very limited. The mentality has been 
something like „let‟s form a committee that the municipal authorities and all the rest will follow suit‟. But it 
didn‟t work like that. (…) We had already „thousands‟ of elections and every time the problems are the same, 
but these are not limited to the lack of resources. There are many other issues involved: waste of resources (…), 
the rationality of massive projects, the control of public organisations, and so on” (interview on 23 Jul 2008). 
 
Because of its institutional weaknesses, the Guanabara Bay Committee has been virtually absent 
from the controversies around infra-structure and development programmes that are likely to have 
major impacts in terms of water management in the Baixada. A new petrochemical complex (Comperj) 
is being constructed in the vicinities of Baixada, on the eastern section of the Guanabara Bay, which 
will represent a major increase in water demand in the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro. It is 
intriguing that the petrochemical project was approved by the federal government – in an area already 
suffering from water deficits – without any decision about water supply (five possible alternatives were 
under consideration at the time of our fieldwork). The intensification of road traffic associated with 
Comperj will also require the construction of a new road by-pass (called the Metropolitan Crescent) to 
connect the petrochemical plant with the Port of Sepetiba on the other side of the Metropolitan Area. 
One of the most negative impacts of the Metropolitan Crescent is the fact that it is likely to lead to 
additional housing expansion over the last remaining areas of natural vegetation, located in the 
headwaters of the Iguaçu River and have been so far preserved due to their being relatively difficult to 
access. These two examples of a poorly planned development reveal how the most recent public 
policies for the region have reproduced the same pattern of short-term gain and lasting environmental 
impacts, which form the essence of unsustainability and unsustainable development.  
 
3. Discussion and Conclusions: Water Sustainability as a Work in Progress  
 
The water management problems in the Baixada Fluminense are not uncommon in peripheral 
metropolitan areas, particularly in Southern countries, that in recent decades experienced fast rates of 
growth and limited investments in infra-structure. Nevertheless, the specific circumstances of the 
Baixada Fluminense reflect a combination of long-term social marginalisation, abandonment of the 
local river system and lack of proper regulatory measures. This gamut of problems is not simply a sign 
of incompetence or lack of commitment on the part of civil servants and engineers – who, in our 
opinion, demonstrate a sincere will to improve the local circumstances – but is an indication of 
stronger underlying distortions created by decades of authoritarianism, populism, inadequate urban 
policies and disregard for the daily suffering of the local population. In other words, the limited 
integration between public authorities and between spatial areas, the ever-growing need for additional 




funds and the deficiency of urban planning and environmental regulation are ultimately manifestations 
of an entrenched legacy of social exclusion and environmental injustices. In similar circumstances, 
Gutberlet and Hunter identified a direct relation between political marginalisation and bad living 
conditions in the periphery of São Paulo [53]. As mentioned in the introduction, conflicts around water 
use and conservation are intrinsically related to issues of fairness and the democratisation of 
management strategies. The most important manifestation of water unsustainability in the Baixada is 
precisely the fact that problems are identified and responses are formulated, but impacts and 
inequalities are constantly reproduced through development policies and the authoritarian attitude of 
public agencies. It means that water unsustainability is not simply the trend of bad water quality and 
water scarcity, but is deeply embedded in the highly asymmetric balance of power between the local 
communities and the political and economic priorities of regional development. 
It is also worth noting that the power mechanisms behind water problems operate not only through 
the control of the state apparatus by hegemonic private interests, but also through the very failures of 
the official plans and projects. Water problems in a highly populated area, such as the Baixada, serve 
as an appealing justification for new official initiatives and investment plans, although no programme 
is ever formulated in consultation with the local communities. On the contrary, the political machinery 
benefits from the manipulation of social despair with electoral promises and, between elections, the 
occasional provision of water tanks. In the last two decades, despite substantial amounts of money 
invested in water infra-structure (estimated between one and one and a half billion dollars), the level of 
pollution, flooding and water scarcity has only increased. Water management demands are identified in 
one project only to be replicated in the next, with waste of resources and frustration of expectations. 
Successive projects have been hampered by implementation delays and, since 1990, been characterised 
by an increasing „scientificisation‟ of water management (which has also proven inadequate to deal 
with the political origins of water problems). The unresponsiveness of the official agencies and in 
particular the customer treatment provided by the water utility (CEDAE) demonstrate that the 
underlying challenge is not technical, but essentially political. Scarce resources and operational 
difficulties have been significantly exacerbated by the lack of commitment of public agencies to 
ameliorate the quality of public water services, whilst the local population lacks the political means to 
revert these long-established trends. Many residents mentioned a number of times when they organised 
protests and hired buses to take people down the CEDAE‟s headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, but the 
water utility have systematically refused to listen. In one occasion, they received an ominous 
recommendation from a utility manager: “pray to rain, that is the best you can do…” (interview with a 
resident of Duque de Caxias, 06 Jul 2008).  
The institutionalised unsustainability of water management in the Baixada has re-emerged in recent 
attempts to respond to social and environmental demands through the implementation of the new water 
legislation (informed by the goals of integration and sustainability). To be sure, the new institutional 
framework is certainly an improvement in relation to the decision-making carried out during the 
dictatorial period or even the populism that characterised government action earlier in the 20th century. 
There is now a regulatory structure that includes consultations and open meetings, whilst the 
Guanabara Bay Committee is the formal arena of representation. However, a more qualitative 
assessment of these recent developments reveals a disturbing paradox: the adoption of key elements of 




the agenda of water sustainability has not resulted in more democratic and inclusive water policies. As 
openly stated by the chief-director of the water regulation agency (SERLA), “it is not because the 
committee recommends something that the intervention of public agencies will have to follow it” (cf. 
minutes of the Guanabara Bay Committee meeting, 24 Apr 2008). If current policies and initiatives 
have broadened the agenda to formally include elements of public participation, these still operate 
within the limited space created by the technocratic rationality that conceals or denies the political 
dimension of water problems. As described by Cooke and Kothari, behind a discourse of participatory 
democracy, there are only rigid and centralised forms of decentralisation [16]. Although the new 
regulatory context encourages the formation of a „multistakeholder dialogue‟ that is supposed to 
involve all social actors of the Guanabara Bay, it is normally the case that government agencies 
maintain a privileged position in the decision-making process, while most of the other stakeholders are 
not really considered as partners (as identified elsewhere [54]). Overall, the Guanabara River 
Committee quickly became another missed opportunity to join efforts for the resolution of long-
standing water problems, especially because its activities have been systematically contained by 
government pressures and economic priorities (such as the petrochemical industry).  
The Guanabara Bay Committee was created by gubernatorial decree and in frontal disagreement 
with the bottom-up mobilisation that started to emerge in different river basins in the Metropolitan 
Area. At the same time, other organisations that historically served to express public opinion, such as 
the neighbourhood associations and the Political Committee of Sanitation, have been increasingly 
ignored by public authorities and even local communities. Because of the enduring and unresolved 
water problems, the public seems more predisposed to resort to populist politicians (that can at least 
answer to their urgent demands) rather than taking part in endless meetings and protest marches. In the 
last few years, environmental NGOs have become an increasingly important player in the water debate 
in the Baixada. However, most environmental NGOs adopt a more „pragmatic‟ strategy, such as claims 
for eco-efficiency or better environmental regulation, instead of more directly addressing the political 
dimension of water management problems. The typical NGO activist in the Baixada is a low middle 
class individual with a university degree and strong views about the environment, but not necessarily a 
clear political affiliation. Tesh and Paes-Machado make reference to the experience in other parts of 
Brazil, where, despite the obvious agreement about the insalubrious condition facing the majority of 
the Brazilian population, environmental-movement organizations have paid scant attention to 
sanitation and limited their activities to the preservation of natural resources and the prevention of 
industrial pollution [55]. In that sense, environmental activists frequently ignore the politicised basis of 
water management problems and, as a result, may fail to offer a more substantive contribution to 
address unsustainable trends. 
The search for water sustainability in the Baixada Fluminense should be seen as an element of the 
ongoing transition from „old‟ to „new„ regulatory approaches in the state of Rio de Janeiro. That 
involves not only the improvement of technical and managerial systems, but more importantly the 
construction of participative forms of decision-making. It is clear that some progress has been made 
and, at least in the discourse, new policies and projects demonstrate a higher level of integration and 
environmental concern. However, there is still plenty of evidence that, despite changes in the rhetoric, 
water managers and policy-makers maintain a detached and highly structured dialogue with local 




communities and their political leadership. It is not enough to call for „public participation‟ and „non 
structural measures‟ (to replace more rigid engineering interventions) when the problems of water 
management remain related to the asymmetric balance of power and democratic deficits. The 
engagement of the local public cannot be only a formal requirement of public guidelines or 
development programmes, but needs to be seem as part of a more radical process of change [56] and 
should necessarily include distributive and compensatory measures [25]. Finally, a genuine agenda of 
water sustainability for the Baixada cannot be dissociated from the reversal of highly discriminatory 
process of urban growth and socioeconomic development. Ultimately, water sustainability remains a 
sectoral issue, but with profound demands and repercussions for other areas of environmental 
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